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Jeffrey K. /lass 
The Experience of War 
and the Construction of Normality. 
Lessons from the Blockade 
of Leningrad· 
War and Social Meaning: 
Interpretations and Political Normality 
On June 22, I 94 I, the Nazi war machine crossed the border into 
the Soviet Union, initiating a process that would shape post-war 
Soviet politics and society in fundamental ways. This is no small 
claim: the twin revolutions of 1917 and I 929 - the first «from 
below» and the second «from above» -- were (and remain) awesome 
moments of social change and transformation . However, Wester!l 
historiography remains trapped within the shadows of these first two 
events , to the detriment of the third . This is odd, considering how 
important experiences of war are in Western polities. Events of war 
and their interpretations (at that moment and subsequently) shape 
symbols and discourse of political normality. World War I created 
throughout Western Europe a cynicism to politics of modernity and 
the nation, while World War I I paradoxically rebuilt national identity 
and feeling. In Britain, the experience of total war twice shaped 
national consciousness, enhancing distrust of the Continent (source of 
both wars) and a feeling of unique heroism against tremendous odds. 
The myth of Dunkirk and the Battle of Britain reverberate today; the 
late Queen Mother was revered because she and George VI, remained 
in London during the Blitz and went out in public to inspect damage, 
an image of a monarch sharing his subjects' tribulations and creating 
a bond. The impact of war, especially World War I I, on Soviet and 
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Russian identities, conceptions or political and social normality and 
legitimacy, and social practices is both well-known and unknown: 
well-known in that Russians and Western scholars of the region 
understand the impo11ancc or the war for Soviet society and afterward; 
unknown in that Western scholarship has paid little theoretical or 
empirical attention to this subject. Despite this impot1ancc of World 
War II to Soviet politics and society, and its potential contributions to 
understandings of politics and power generally, Western studies of the 
Soviet experience pays scant or only passing attention to the impo11ancc 
of World War I I in shaping Soviet politics. 1 
In this essay I use the example of the Blockade of Leningrad -
an ext reme example of the Soviet experience of World War 11 , and 
an extreme example of the experience of war generally - to addn;ss 
two issues. The first is a more general, theoretical issue: the importance 
of war to the construction of political and social normality and 
practices. Political science and sociology have examined the impact 
of war on structures and institutions, such as states or gender roles 
and relations; but the impact of war on meanings and meaning 
systems is addressed only empirically, often without much theoretical 
reflection . The second issue is how World War II shaped the specific 
meaning systems, cosmologies, and assumptions about normal practice 
among Soviet citizens ·- put another \Vay , how the war impacted on 
Soviet hahitus. Given its radical , extreme nature , the Blockade experience 
should go far to illuminating these issues -- and a study of the 
Blockade can also liberate those voices and experiences kept in the 
quiet for too long, ironically in the name of' Soviet authority and the 
stable rule of the Communist Party. 
War and Soviet Society 
The usual account of the emergence of Soviet institutions, belief<:; , 
and practices stresses the Revolution and the 1930s. The post -
1945 Soviet social order is fundamentally that of the 1930s; narratives 
do not place much, if any, emphasis on the impact or World War II. 
Even so-called «revisionists» of Soviet history do not go beyond 1939 
to explain the rise of Soviet civilization: Soviet politics ends in 1938, 
and the rest is a footnote. 2 Sheila Fitzpatrick and students have 
Produced fine scholarship on workers, peasants, and the state, and on 
relations of power, culture, and resistance in the I 930s.1 Stephen 
Kotkin 's Magnetic Mountain examines Stalinism as civilization, without 
asking whether that civilization's development was fundamentall y 
shaped by the experience of the war that followed - not simply that 
the war might have legitimated sacrifices and seemingly bizarre 
Policies of the 1930s, but that the war might have changed the very 
241 
ways that the Soviet people thought or their system anJ elite, and 
how that elite and its operatives (e.g. in the Party of NKVD- KGB) 
might have , in turn, though about a society that !'cit it deserved more 
freedom, peace, and plenty following even great.er sacrifices and 
victory by 1945.1 
Studies or Soviet identity as well focus exclusively on the 1930s 
without considering the impact or the war --·· war, which in the West 
played a crucial role in the formation of national consciousness. (If 
Stalin and his people built socialism in the 1930s, his people 
defended it afterwards.) Jochen Hellbeck 's discussion of the creation 
of the new Soviet subject (using intimate diary materials) is titled 
Revolution on my Mind, as if the creation of that subject is primarily 
an outcome of the l 930s.5 One good illustration of this oversight in 
scholarship is a chapter by Ronald Grigor Suny in an edited book 
on the USSR and Nazi Germany.6 In a 27 -pagc overview of the rise 
and consolidation of Stalin 's authority and system , Suny assigns two 
pages to World War 1 I, conflating the complex history of war and 
aftermath (Stalin's early breakdown, confusion over strategies, 
Leningrad's symbolic challenge and the «Zhdanov affair»). Suny also 
assumes the war played to Stalin's game of personal power and 
Soviet legitimacy: «Official propaganda convincingly identified the 
victory over Nazism with the superiority of the Soviet system, its 
organic link with rodina (the motherland) , and the personal genius of 
Stalin. » 7 It did? Was propaganda so convincing, or did people have 
their own worldviews about victory and status? What aspects of «the 
system» were organically linked to the «motherland»? 
This is particularly odd considering the importance Soviet scholars 
(as well as state and people) gave to the war and that some archiv~I 
materials from the war period arc open. 8 Perhaps more important 15 
that historical and comparative sociological has successfully pointe_d 
out the significance of war to politics and social structure. This 
should have alerted scholars to the likelihood that World War II 
would have a significant impact on Soviet society and politi~s. 
Certainly this was understood in private discussions and university 
lectures; yet in the discourse of Western scholarship, the story of the 
war was confined primarily to accounts of military history or 
Stalin ' s Jeadershi p. I do not want to make the error of replacing one 
all-determining historical moment ( 1917, the 1930s) with another 
(World War I I) . I take as given that pre-1941 historical events were 
an important foundation for Soviet institutions, identities, and practices. 
However, these historical trajectories were reshaped by war; no better 
proof exists than the fact that by the 1960s more work was published 
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on the war than on the Revolution, and Brezhnev resurrected the 
war experience to create a «cult of war.»9 The experience and victory 
of war - surviving the horrifying Nazi onslaught at Leningrad , 
Sevastopol, and Stalingrad and emerging victorious - legitimated the 
Soviet project. Socialism was not merely the absence of exploitation, 
it was the expression of a superior modernity in a real confrontation 
with the capitalist West. 10 Scholarship on war elsewhere shows that 
if other foundational myths persist, the experience of war changes 
them or subordinates them, and adds to the social pantheon. 11 To 
make sense of the construction of political culture and dynamics of 
political legitimation and normalization, we cannot avoid war. It is 
time to reincorporate it into the study of Soviet history. 12 
War and Socio-Political Meaning 
Social science has shown the centrality of war to modernity: no 
war, no nationalism, no modern state, no modern welfare , retarded 
development of women 's right- the list could go on. 13 These accounts 
tend lo privilege either structures and institutions or social-
psychological dynamics. In political science the obvious body of work 
is international relations. In political sociology, scholars have looked 
more at war lo make sense of modern political structure and 
institutions. Theda Skocpol demonstrated the centrality of war to 
revolutions and American welfare . 1-1 Just as the British welfare system 
was born after World War II , to reward the «land of heroes,» 
American welfare began as a reward (or political bribe) to heroes 
who fought in the Civil War. Charles Tilly also changed our 
understanding of the emergence of states and variation in state 
structures by relating state-making to war- making. 15 In these studies, 
however,meaning remains problematic - it is missing,epiphenomenal, 
or related primarily to propaganda or elites. While not wanting to 
turn entirely to a pluralist model of politics, 16 I suggest this oversight 
requires correction . Meaning among non-elites is as important as 
meaning among elites, for this relates to the elites' «formula of rule,» 
the claims and rhetoric which legitimate elite power and turn it into 
accepted authority. 17 Distance between official propaganda and policies, 
and popular meanings and convictions, can impact politics in several 
Ways. Alternative meanings can survive underground and act as a 
Springboard for resistance, or at least dampen support when challenge 
emerges. 18 Thus, a central issue becomes how people interpret and give 
meaning to their experiences of war. If political culture is important, 19 
the context that generates political culture is central to helping us 
Understand where national meanings and traditions emerge. Because 
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of its power and impact through such traumas as sacrifice and loss, 
war is one such context. 20 
This essay begins to broach these issues by examining what kinds 
of meanings emerge «from below» in the experience of war -- not 
only meanings per se, but also their structure into dichotomies of 
sacred and profane. The relation the «formula of rule» and average 
people 's frames depends in part on how people construct dichotomies 
of social and political sacred and profane. The experience of war 
shapes such dichotomi.es - in the case of the Blockade, dichotomies 
often present in Soviet logic and propaganda. However, these sacred-
profane dichotomies led to potential and often powerful contradictions 
between idealized sacred norms and values - ideals made more ideal 
by the Blockade experience - versus everyday practices of survival 
that often slid into the profane. This will be clearer in the moral 
economy of food, where the socialist system of state-run provision was 
supposed to insure survival and fairness, but where Leningradcrs had to 
tum to less ideal means to obtain enough food to survive. As well , we 
will sec a moral economy of bodies and death - the ideal of a peaceful 
order under Soviet socialism, versus the realities of corpses littering 
the streets or cannibalism. Certainly this will not exhaust all themes 
from experiences and diaries, although a few powerful themes reappear: 
cold, hunger, bombing and shelling, exerting one's will to stay active 
and alive, and cooperation versus exclusion. 21 Such issues became 
central to making sense of the Blockade, the war, and social normality. 
As an example of war 's most horrendous impact on civilians, the 
Blockade of Leningrad provides a powerful source of data on this very 
process. In general, however, the Soviet experience of World War II 
is a powerful laboratory for studying the process of creating, imposing, 
consuming, and resisting political meanings and hegemony: not only 
was this a major (if not the major) point in Soviet history; the Soviet 
regime and its state officials were also very conscious of the importance 
of political culture, as noted. Put simply, the Blockade provides a 
radical case of the experience of war (not only of the Soviet 
experience, although this is part of our investigation as well): 
bombing and shelling; suffering and deprivation (lack of heat and 
water during cold winters, horrendously inadequate food supply); 
constant threat from a powerful, aggressive enemy; constant propagand;:i 
from home and aggressor states; constant interaction with one s 
state and regime during wartime; location directly at the front line 
but not occupicd. 22 With the effects of war and the struggle for 
survival at their most intense and desperate, we can see the effects ?f 
war on individuals and institutions at their starkest. Much as Kotktn 
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used Magnitogorsk as a focused case study to examine the building of 
Soviet socialism, I use the Blockade as a focused case study on war·s 
effects in general, and in particular on state -society relations and 
constructions of meaning and legitimacy. 23 
Ascertaining Interpretations «From Below»: Diaries 
Wartime diaries provide one source of data on the interaction 
between the experience of war and the formation of social and 
political meanings . While a few diaries were obviously a continuation 
of pre-war diaries, which the Party often encouraged among its 
activists and members as a way of inculcating the new Soviet 
identity, 24 many diaries began on or soon after the outbreak of the 
war - showing the significance of the war and Blockade to 
Leningraders ' own identities and senses of overall mcaning.25 Such 
meanings (and culture in general) are contextual, and comprehending 
the dynamics governing the formation of meaning required accounting 
for that context. War time diaries, correspondence (e.g. letters), and 
other forms of communication and discourse shed some light on 
those dynamics. 26 Wartime diaries also help avoid the danger of 
circularity: we see what people were thinking during the war, not what 
they read into it afterwards. Post-war reflections are important but 
do not show war's impact at the moment of war. 
This is not a study of «public opinion» per se, for reasons of 
sampling. It is far from clear that Leningradcrs who left extensive 
diaries (or diaries at all), for posterity or especially for archives, are 
adequately representative . Certainly in archives one finds diaries 
written by blue-collar workers (usually skilled), white -collar personnel, 
managers, Party and state officials, cultural workers (including members 
of the intelligentsia); by men and women; by older, middle-aged, and 
Young (teen-aged) inhabitants; by those born in Leningrad and 
those who moved to it. The number of diaries left behind is small in 
comparison to the city's population, and it is difficult to control for 
individual peculiarities (e.g. of individual personal history and habitus) 
that would color issues and interpretations. Further, writing a diary is 
an exercise in discipline - making entries on a regular basis, 
including sufficient detail and commentary so that the diary provides 
sufficient content for analysis. Even disciplined people may be loo 
busy with work, life, or survival. However, a study of diaries can be 
helpful at an early stage in this kind of study. Extrapolating from 
existing diaries can provide hypotheses fur further testing or 
refinement. As well, even such a limited data set can provide insights 
into what people actually thought, what they felt was important to 
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take time to write down, and how they came to those issues and 
meanings (which we could infer from contexts in which issues and 
comments arose). This is people 's own meanings, not what closed-
endcd surveys tease out. In a system where formal discourse was 
controlled through censorship, threats of arrest, and Party control of 
information, diaries are a site and vehicle of personal, underground 
discourse - not discourse between people but for the self. To tease 
out that personal, underground discourse, I try to use diary material 
from as many different social strata and contexts as possible, to 
provide important insights and help us possible discover sets of 
meanings and patterns of wartime meaning formation that alter can 
be tested in different places and times. Naturally we must be aware 
not only of what diarists mentioned but also what they did not, 27 for 
sometimes people felt the need for caution, given constant reminders 
on wall placards about the need to avoid contributing to rumors that 
might help the enemy. 28 
The war, and especially the Blockade , weakened Party's ability to 
conduct propaganda. Internal documents within the division for 
agitation and propaganda note the immense difficulties carrying out 
«agitprop» work. Party aktiv were mobilized for other activities , 
such as helping the evacuation, mobilizing production, and even 
going to fight (or getting out of the city) ; agitprop cadres could 
also fall victim to death from hunger or cold. 29 As a result, there 
were fewer agitprop cadres left to give lectures, hold discussions 
and «office hours,» visit factories and homes, and continue putting 
up newspapers on street walls. 30 Thus, there was likely some degree 
of individual autonomy in keeping diaries. While Hellbeck rejects 
the public-private dichotomy as an artifact of liberal societies, 31 this 
weakens our appreciation for games of power and resistance. As 
Erving Goffman noted ,people experience multiple front stages and 
back stages, and they play to these different audiences. 32 Following 
this insight and his own research, James C. Scott noted that people 
have great creative capacity for playing different transcripts in 
different contexts; the private becomes where people feel relatively 
safer from the gaze and exercise of power. 33 Despite the Stalinist 
regime and totalitarian repression, the war was a moment of 
liberation. The reality of war and survival, coupled with the Party-
state's preoccupation with the war, provides a glimpse into some 
autonomous making of meaning-not only during war, but also in 
the midst of Soviet socialism's grand project of remaking humans 
into homo sovieticus. 
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Themes, Tropes, and Interpretations: 
Making Meaning of the Blockade 
I carry out this analysis in the double spirit of verstehen and 
induction. Max Weber saw verstehen as the heart of social scicnce -
to understand how people think and, in doing so, reproduce social 
structures and institutions. This survives in the tradition of the 
sociology of knowledge and ethnographic methods. I approach 
verstehen by going directly to people 's own representations as well as 
actions - looking at what was done (to the best of our ability to 
account for practices) and at how actions were interpre ted . This also 
follows Hellbeck's analysis of Stalinism and personal identities: by 
looking closely at how people discussed themselves and contexts in 
diaries, Hellbeck followed the construction or the subject amidst 
Stalinist institutions and power relations. 34 Further, given that theory 
of state-society relations and political legitimacy/ normality remains 
underdeveloped , there are few concrete propositions to test. 
I use two tactics to provide some analytic structure . The first tactic 
is to compare diarists from different social locations, or location 
within a society's structural-institutional matrix. There are myriad 
locations one could choose from. Because of the importance of 
formal ideology to the Soviet system, 35 relation to the Party seems 
important , at least at the outset of the analysis. As well, given the 
Soviet Union's anti-capitalist ideology and institutional order, relations 
to the state seem important as well. In the Soviet construction of 
«class,» three classes were important: the working class, the peasantry, 
and the intelligentsia. A fourth unofficial «class» was the bureaucracy-
unavoidablc, massive as the bureaucracy was in a modem but anti-
capitalist society (where the state takes the place of private property 
and civil society) . Finding peasant diaries in the Blockade has proven 
difficult, so I leave this group out. I have drawn my data from a 
selection of diaries whose authors cover a range of social locations. 
These include a model «new Soviet person» (a skilled worker and 
Komsomolets); assistant managers at industrial enterprises; an older 
industrial worker sympathetic to the Party and Soviet power; a 
woman from the cultural intelligentsia who did cultural work during 
the Blockade; a young woman trained as an engineer, starting her 
working life as the Blockade struck; an assistant to the planning 
department at the Seventh State Electric Station who also worked at 
the Sevkabel factory ; a young boy (likely 11-12 years old) not yet 
been subject to the full force of propaganda; and a teacher and artist. 
While any «social location» (class, ethnicity, etc.) is a social construction, 
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people took the identities and consequences of such locations 
seriously. One related issue is sampling and representation. Diaries in 
archives are not a random sample of the Leningrad population; 
diarists in particular, by the very action of keeping a diary, arc 
involved in a more active process of creating meaning. I keep this in 
mind so as to be modest with claims. 
My second tactic for structuring the narratives and analysis is to 
follow particular themes that are important to making sense of the 
war-legitimacy nexus and that appear to recur. There is a caveat here: 
given the stress on induction and the spirit of hypothesis-generation 
in this essay, the problems of selection bias, and the differences in 
actual personalities of those who kept diaries, any comparison will be 
less than perfect. The usual rule of comparisons is to be as rigorous 
as possible in controlling for the variables under examination; we 
will have to be a little lenient here, given the nature of the data. This 
warning aside, I pay close attention to what people viewed as sacred 
and profane. What was the everyday Blockade experience for these 
people? What had real meaning, and how was that meaning colored 
by war? This helps us construct an initial picture of a moral order: 
suffering and death; the moral economy of provision, and survival in 
general; and who the heroes and villains were. Suffering and death 
are rampant in war, interrupting our sense of order, stability, and 
fairness; this is related to theodicy, why suffering or tragedy strikes 
those who seemingly do not deserve it. 36 To address suffering and 
death, Leningrad inhabitants tried to remake sense of the normal 
order of the social universe to explain or justify suffering. By «moral 
economy» I follow E. P. Thompson's example: claims and meanings 
(sacred and profane) assigned to economic experiences. Crucial here 
is obtaining food, whether in the formal system of state-run stores 
and rationing, or via the rynok (bazaar) . What did people say about 
privileges and privations - did they comment on how they got food, 
while commenting on or critiquing how others did so? Moral 
economy is important because here the reality of survival ran headlong 
into formal Bolshevik discourse and value systems: while people could 
«speak Bolshevik» and articulate (and perhaps in the process even 
accept) the regime's claims about morality and reality, no discourse by 
itself generates food. How did individuals deal with the reality of 
obtaining food in an anti-capitalist workers' paradise at war?37 
I propose the following structure of sacred-profane categories and 
dichotomies. While not exhaustive, this encapsulates several hypotheses: 
that interpretations of war and Blockade were structured in such a 
way; that framing as sacred-profane provides explanatory power to 
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us, investigators, and to blokadniki; and that dichotomies were 
sufficiently significant that Party-state elites had to address them 
during and after the war. ix 
Sacred 
Order 
Collectivist behavior, ko/lektiv 
Moral economy of provision 
Contentment 
Justice and equality 
Cleanliness 
Reality (e.g. of rumors, experience) 
Relations (e.g. to outside, to others) 
Death = natural cause s; respected 
Soviet/Russian nation . people; 
Party as ideal 
Profane 
Chaos 
J ndividualism. self 
Market/ patronage 
economy of provision 
Suffering 
Favoritism and patronage 
Filthiness 
Propaganda and official news 
Isolation (e.g. from rest 
of USSR.others) 
Death = result of cruelty; 
hidden, disrespectful 
Fascists (Party cadres 
sometimes here) 
The issue of sacred versus profane is important in this analysis 
because it was a unifying logic throughout diarists ' narratives ·-
somcthing that would not surprise Emile Durkheim. 39 Commenting 
on events and observations, diarists created dichotomies: profanity of 
real behavior versus the sacredness of ideals; or of two different 
observed behaviors that roughly corresponded to sacred (ideal) 
versus profane. Durkheim noted the importance of sacred and 
profane in the construction of religious cosmologies and, generally, in 
the construction of social identity: the sacred as us and what the 
collective ideally means, versus the profane of the outside «other» 
that defines the self or group through opposition . If Kotkin is 
correct and Bolshevism was a religion or church of sorts, where 
capitalism was profane and the Soviet leadership defined Soviet 
socialism as its sacred anti-capitalist antithesis, then we should see 
sacred-profane dichotomies appear as part of the fundamental 
structure of commentary, if not of the narratives of events themselves. 
War as Drama 
The first theme that structures narratives - a theme which appears 
fairly consistently across diaries usually without diarists noting it - is 
the sense of the Blockade, and the war generally, as drama. While drama 
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itself is not sacred or profane, through it diarists drew out sacred and 
profane logics: a noble drama of preparation , hope, volunteerism, and a 
profanity of defeat and retreat , tragedy , sufTcring, and corruption . A<> 
such, the logic of drama helps structure sacred-profane dichotomies 
that follow , as authors «discovered» dichotomies as the drama unkllded. 
Further, if the Soviet mission of constructing anti-capitalist modernity 
in the 1930s was Manichean, the drama of war extended but also 
altered it : sacred in pitting Soviet civilization against fascism (ironically 
alongside capitalist democracies), profane in its very essence or being 
war. The USSR played a leading role in the drama, defending the 
civilized world against uncivilized fascist aggression. Diaries are littered 
with references to uncivilized Germans, and popular views dovetailed 
with propaganda of' Germans as «beasts» (zven") deserving hatred , 
contempt, and rcvenge. 40 Within Soviet civilization , some actors had 
more prominent roles than others: Stalin and the Red Army, but also 
inhabitants or Leningrad in their own versions of the drama. While 
they neither fought at the front nor made military decisions, they did 
hold out, maintained production , and sacrificed money, time , energy, 
and life for the war effort and to defend Leningrad. As much as the 
people, the city itself as entity is perhaps the prominent actor. Diarists 
repeatedly make reference to Leningrad as a city of beauty, culture, and 
history: the cradle or the revolution, home to prominent Russian 
cultural creations, its combination or architecture and weather gave it 
a sense of lite reflected in nineteenth-century writings (e.g. by Gogol , 
Dostoevskii, and others). 
Plays and movies, according to the general rule of thumb, have 
three acts: the first sets up the scenario and begins the tension, the 
second develops the contracjictions underlying the dramatic tension , 
and the third revolves the contradictions. Diaries did not follow this 
three-act structure perfectly, but there is a sense of an underlying 
drama at work. These acts followed the logic of sacred-profane and its 
contradictions of ideals versus reality and practice. Act one involved 
the sudden intrusion of war into the peaceful ideal of Soviet socialist 
life (even if the reality or the Terror, the Winter War against Finland , 
and the constant international threats belied this). How could war, 
and the rapid German advance, happen amidst the peace-loving 
Soviet population that in the 1930s tried to build the more perfect 
future (including one without capitalist wars)? Act two involved the 
tension of survival and both the breakdown and solidification of 
norms as practices. The tension itself was the very act of confronting-
but not always resolving - contradictions of ideals versus real 
survival. «Socialism» was not enough. Act three was the resolution of 
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tension through «banalization» of war - the implicit acceptance of 
the Blockade as a reality and an attempt to rebuild ideal norms as 
practices - and eventual victory. 
Act one was the beginning of the war - fairly dramatic in 
itself - leading up to the encirclement of Leningrad. This was a 
period of high tension and chaos: children and women were 
(sometimes) evacuated, not always successfully; workers volunteered 
en masse for the Red Army or the narodnoe opolchenie (voluntary 
battalions to support the troops even in combat); other male workers 
and many women workers were sent outside the city to help dig 
trenches, often getting caught up in the drama of refugees, retreating 
soldiers, and the advancing G erman army. As Aleksei Koslovskii 
noted, the first month of war was like «an entire epoch,» with the 
Red Army heroically defending the motherland. 41 Wartime measures 
were hurriedly introduced, including air raid sirens and patrols. The 
shock of war and of rapid mobilization, along with the juxtaposition 
of two radically different states of being - sacred peace and profane 
war - set up one defining trope of Act one, a sense of surreality and 
heroism that would mark myths and images of the war, as well as the 
foundation of sacred and profane . The pre-war era was a moment of 
peace, normality, personal enjoyment with friends and family, in 
contrast to the chaos, destruction, and suffering. The beautiful summer 
(normality) was interrupted by war. For Irina Zelenskaia , the June 
weather and distant threat of Germany lulled her into a sense of 
security; she had to remind herself that there was a war on.42 Nina 
Kobyzeva started her diary six months into the war; the first sixty 
pages are a recollection of pre-war weeks. She even introduced her 
diary like a novel, with a cast of characters, and she set up the tension 
by juxtaposing pre-war life as one of freedom - a recent divorce 
from a troubling husband, wanderings with friends along the banks of 
the Gulf of Finland, preparing to meet the wonders of summertime 
Leningrad .43 Aleksei Kozlovskii began his diary by noting how, in 
June, he headed to his dacha and saw ominous silhouettes of planes 
in the sky; the next day he was called back to his enterprise for 
official news of events - an interruption of the usual state of affairs 
in Leningrad in June. 44 
Part of the logic of the first act was patriotism and volunteerism: 
Leningrad would not surrender, the Red Army and Soviet people 
would inevitably defeat the invaders (unlike the French, as some 
noted) . As one communist noted later, he and comrades were ready 
to fight. He noticed in the early days of war how Leningraders were 
confident of victory. 45 Another, on June 22, noted how the city was 
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calm and Leningraders were cold -blooded and ready to fight. In 
meetings at city enterprises, workers were confident of victory and 
voluntary mobilized for the front. 46 Molotov's speech signaled the 
sta11 of war; Stalin's speech several weeks later made the Leader 
seem a fellow comrade and human being (some commented on 
hearing him sipping water during the speech). Some diarists felt 
pangs of separation from family: husbands sent wives and children to 
safety while bravely remaining to organize work. 47 Granted, not all 
diarists had a rosy view or were skeptical of the state's ability to 
properly organize defensive measures. Nina Kobyzova was worried of 
a repeat of the chaos of the Russo-Finnish War, which «showed what 
kind of order we have on the railroads during the smallest disorders.»48 
Repeatedly she asked where advice would come from, for it was not 
forthcoming from authorities.'19 She also noted that, while younger 
male workers eagerly signed up for service (including her close 
friend Petya), «[enterprise] bosses started agitating the people to 
come forward and volunteer, and for image themselves were signing 
up, but then they cunningly got out of the army.» 50 
The hopes and masculinity of mobilizing for war in act one - in 
many ways an ignorance of the horror of war, much in the same way 
as Allied and German youth signed up happily for war in 1914, 
only to realize the magnitude of the act later on - gave way to Act 
two, which begins roughly in early November 1941. Here the 
profanity emerges, bringing up the full force of sacred-profane 
dichotomies; with the city, people began to realize the immediate 
future will be much more difficult than imagined. One profanity, 
noted with disbelief and even despair in diaries, is retreat, especially 
retreat coupled with disorganization in the military and related 
activities such as evacuations. 51 As the Germans begin to bomb 
Leningrad, rumors emerged about traitors shooting up green signal 
flairs to aid bombers. 52 When the Badaevskii food storage depot is 
bombed and its contents destroyed, food supply deteriorates rapidly, 
and the first feelings of hunger soon follow. News from the front is 
negative: cities surrendered, the Wehrmacht again storming through 
another country en route to victory. One high point in the drama is 
the German attack on Moscow - finally some good news when the 
Nazi war machine is turned back from the capital. However, the 
tension of war continued as hunger and cold worsened. Electricity 
and water supplies end, leaving people in darkness and needed to 
walk to the Neva river for water. Tram service stops; people have to 
walk to work (sometimes many kilometers), and trams stand still like 
frozen corpses on the street, symbols of the terror of death about to 
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arrive. In December the horror of starvation begins, which creates its 
own set of sacred-profane dichotomies. 
The tension or Act two is survival and acclimation to suffering 
and death, structuring the other sacred-profane dichotomies that 
follow. In a sense, Act two is the «act or profanity.» Act three is quite 
long - roughly May 1942 to January 1944 - but it does partially 
conform to the logic of drama. In Act three, the war and Blockade 
become everyday, accepted, taken -fo r-granted. Sacred-profane 
dichotomies are resolved or held in abeyance. The city's Party 
leaders help prepare to supply the city for the winter and undertake 
measures to clean the streets of corpses, dirt, and debris. Victory 
gardens are planted in the summer; wooden homes are turned into 
firewood. Even shelling and air raids , in 1941 among the more fearful 
of events, become humdrum - which surprised some diarists. 53 
Diarists mention shelling constantly, not only as an interruption of 
normal life but also as the clarion of fear; but by 1942 people were 
used to air-raid sirens and did not let them bother everyday activities, 
e.g. standing in bread Iines. 54 (Partly this may have been due to the 
punctuality of German shelling and air raids.) 55 The air raid sirens 
and shelling were as much a part of Leningrad as the bridges and 
canals, and people feared them less - they were accustomed to them, 
and running for shelter each time invariably interrupted important 
routines such as standing in line for food. (Some diarists also noted 
that the Germans used shelling and accompanying sirens as a form of 
psychological warfare - and so taking shelling and sirens for granted 
may have been a form of resistance for some.) When the Blockade 
was partially broken in 1943, life in the encircled city went on. 
In fact, one defining logic for Act three is banality, as the 
Blockade and war became part of Leningrad byt; the dramatic 
sacred and profane become the everyday sacred and profane. Food 
supply became more regular in 1942; despite unhappy military news 
in the south, the engagement of the Wehrmacht there meant fewer 
resources to storm the city. Despite forebodings that the Germans 
would launch an all-out assault in autumn 1942, most diarists 
seemed to worry less about the destruction or surrender of the city. 
It was now a matter of holding out until the end (which would be 
hastened by the Allies' opening of a second front). 56 Diary material 
became less dramatic, more everyday. People carried on with work; 
they fell in love, tended to everyday matters, cleaned house, took walks. 
The drama of shelling was no longer drama; hunger remained, not as 
bad as in the winter of 1941 - 42, and people were as accustomed to 
it as humans can be. The horrors of war were relatively not as 
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horrible as in the first six months, and the overall tide of war seemed 
inexorably to be turning. People tried to resume their lives as best 
they could. In consequence , diary entries sometimes trail off in Act 
three. Gaps of weeks and even months appear in 1943. January 
1944- May 1945 is usually a postscript or afterthought: the Blockade 
is broken , people weep for joy. January 1944 is usually noted as a day 
of supreme triumph, not only of the Red Army and USSR but 
especially of Leningraders. After this the drama recedes. Many diaries 
stop before the end of World War II: Victory Day is minor 
compared to the end of the Blockade, itself minor compared to the 
suffering of 1941-42. 
Overall, the logic of drama shapes the sacred-profane structure in 
two ways. First , it acts as a metanarrative into which other narratives 
of experience and their sacred-profane logics are flt. Act one is the 
appearance and assumption of the sacred. Act two is the appearance 
of the profane, usually in extreme form. Act three involves partial 
resolution or stagnation of contradictions. Second, Act one is the 
sacred; Act two the profane; Act three a combination in the banal. 
The lifting of the Blockade in January 1944, the ultimate sacred 
moment of freeing the city from the Germans and suffering, ends the 
drama of diaries. That this would not lead to resolution of the sacred -
profane dichotomies - in part because tribulations would continue, 
this time at the hands of Stalin's leadership - was a bitter irony of 
the experience .57 
Homo sovieticus Meets homo economicus. 
Collective Cooperation and the Prisoners' Dilemma 
Part of the Soviet project was the creation of homo sovieticus: not 
only anti-capitalist but also collectivist in norms and practice. Literature 
on pre- Revolutionary and Soviet culture often touches on the 
importance of collectivism; while in practice this was likely as much 
. myth as reality, in discourse collectivism was certainly touted as 
inherent in Russian and Soviet nature and a superior cultural trait 
vis-a-vis the West. 58 Soviet collectivism was invoked in the enterprise 
kollektiv and in communist collective practices, from communal 
living and other services to public samokritika and the practice of 
airing one's thoughts (as hiding something in the private was 
potentially counter-revolutionary). 59 During the Blockade, collectivism 
was tested on two fronts: first, in real practices of individual versus 
collective tactics of survival; second, in how people framed their and 
others ' tactics and behaviors through a individual-collectivist 
dichotomy.60 On the first front, the classic Prisoners' Dilemma played 
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out: did people cooperate and pool resources to survive, and did this 
provide advantages , or did people focus on self to the exclusion of 
others, perhaps ultimately hindering their efforts to survive'? For 
close circles of friends and family where all survived, cooperative 
efforts seem at work: different family members (including older 
children) divided labor of survival. In some diaries one reads of 
ritual divisions of labor, with some group members standing in lines 
at bread stores while others scour the rynki for additional food or 
other needed materials. These groups would also pool their ration 
cards and, if possible, bring food from the workplace, dividing up the 
bread , soup, ersatz chocolate, and the like between family members. 61 
In general, one refrain in diary entries is how people constantly go to 
others' places, or have them come over - sometimes for tea, but 
other times to spend the night (or days and nights on end), sharing 
not just tea but also bread and other food . 
On the other hand, families or groups where people hid food 
from each other or split up seemed to suffer -· or at least 
complain more - about hunger and deprivation. For example, 
diarist PI1tr Samarin complained that his wife hid rations she would 
bring back from work. However, as Samarin himself describes , she 
would also go off to work nearly every day, bring back food, stand in 
various lines for food or other goods, while he sat at work or home 
reading newspapers and wishing her were not too old to join the 
Communist Party or eating at the «buffet» at his workplace (without 
bring food home - or never mentioning doing so). Sometimes he 
appreciated her effort and concern for him, but more often he 
complained how she, younger than he, did not have appropriate 
collective or cooperative values but rather valued herself over 
others. 62 Supposedly she brought home not 500 but 150 grams of 
sugar, or did not bring home anything for him at all (even though 
on one occasion he ate his daily bread ration at his workplace 
cafeteria while complaining she did not bring home additional food); 
one time he claimed she hid food from him. 63 At any rate, even if 
both survived, individual rather than cooperative behavior could at 
the least create strains that added little to daily Blockade life. 
On the second front - framing tactics and behaviors as individual 
or collective (not just collection and use of food), and assigning 
moral weights to one or the other - diaries provide more data, for 
Leningraders intuitively saw the paradox of the Prisoners' Dilemma 
transposed onto the sacred-profane dichotomy of capitalist 
individualism versus Soviet collectivism, in the context of survival 
and war. In other words, the ideal (and sometimes real behavior) of 
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the moral economy of Soviet/ communist collectivism ran head -on 
into the individualism of the Prisoners ' Dilemma and the desperation 
of individual survival. 64 This should not be surprising: in cases of 
extreme suffering and survival as in the Blockade, an individual likely 
will experience conflict between the rationality of collective, cooperative 
behavior (e .g. pooling food rations) and focusing on one 's own 
survival first and foremost (e.g. eating all one's rations and perhaps 
stealing others') . Further, this dichotomy was central to the Bolshevik 
worldview; Soviet practices in the 1930s focused on creating the 
collective, selfless individual, and it would be surprising of people did 
not turn to this logic when structuring their narratives. For example, 
one theme that winds through Irina Zelenskaia's account of the 
Blockade is the issue of individualism and its negative impact on the 
war effort and environment. In particular, individualism came out 
most strongly as people were starving: many people thought mostly 
about how «to defend the rights of their stomachs by any means. »65 
It is clear why this theme is prominent: she oversaw the organization 
of food distribution at her enterprise's cafeteria, and she saw firsthand 
the tensions and conflicts that occurred as the miniscule rations took 
their toll over that horrible first winter - in fact, she compared the 
food lines there to «some kind of [military] front.» Hunger created 
or augmented love for oneself and weakened other morals and 
princi ples. t'6 She dubbed this the «dictatorship of the stomach ,» and 
while she also felt the intense pangs of hunger, she consistently 
claimed that she had to keep active and exercise all her willpower 
not to let hunger take over her reason. 67 Zelenskaia 's observations 
and criticisms of individualism were not confined to food lines. In 
one instance, she noted how an incendiary bomb started a fire on 
Yasilievskii Island. Only one woman tried to put it out; she failed, and 
Zelenskaia commented in disgust, «Such coUectivists!»68 As for suffering, 
Zelenskaia noted that over time people seemed to care less and less 
for their fellow Leningradcrs. 69 She helped out those wasting away 
(e.g. bringing extra food or sharing rations), but she received no 
encouragement from bosses; young girls at the enterprise sewed their 
. own clothes but did not sew clothes for soldiers, and when Zelenskaia 
suggested this would be a good idea, she got no support from 
colleagues.70 As well, those who died were those who could not 
exercise self-discipline; they did not try to help themselves and, by 
becoming idle, could not deflect their attention from hunger. 71 As a 
result, they lost the will to live. 72 
Nina Kobyzova as well coded much behavior around her, especially 
in 1941 -42, through this sacred-profane dichotomy. For example, at 
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the outbreak of war, she noted how many women around her tried to 
avoid any service to the war effort or scrambled madly to get onto 
evacuation lists. One can appreciate the desire to evacuate with the 
Germans approaching , but for Kobyzova, using networks or various 
excuses that others could use but did not (e .g. family and children , 
accompanying evacuated factory equipment to guard it) smacked or 
cowardice .73 As water pipes froze, people turned to the Neva and 
canals for water, and Kobyzova noted how crowds cutting through 
Fontanka ice acted rudely , loudly arguing and shoving each other 
with water buckets -- another picture she would remember all her 
lire. 74 At one point she suggested that truly moral behavior meant 
thinking first and foremost of general Soviet victory, not only about 
surviving and breaking the Blockade (a local front on the overall war). 
r n other words, the general victory was more important than 
Leningrad - admittedly, a view I seldom saw in diaries.75 Jn early 
1942, reflecting on how much her mother did for her during the 
worst days of the winter of 1941 - 42 , Kobyzova recalled how one 
woman at her enterprise, also a mother, refused to share bread or 
money with her children. This was in contrast to Kobyzova 's 
situation - in both cases, mothers had a chance to help their young-
adult daughters, but one refused. In fact, this other mother -- clearly 
juxtaposed to Kobyzova 's own mother - accepted money from her 
son (who might have been at the front, although this was not clear) 
but did not even share that. In one short entry, Kobyzova sets up the 
individualist-collective, selfish-sharing dichotomy - not in terms of 
the rationality of sharing (the logic of the Prisoners ' Dilemma) -
rather, she framed it in moral terms of the normality of cooperation 
and the abnormality of individualism. 
Zelenskaia and Kobyzeva were not the only diarists to structure 
much of their narrative in terms of sacred collective versus profane 
individual; one diarist I read who does not raise this issue was a 
young boy who tried to refrain from judging others. 76 The collective-
individual dichotomy sometimes was wrapped into other dichotomies 
I discuss below-sometimes explaining them, sometimes explained by 
them - and so I let data below augment this discussion. In general, 
however, other diarists also expressed disillusionment or disgust at 
individualist, selfish behavior they saw around them. Red Army 
soldiers, for example, were sacrificing themselves for the defense of 
the Motherland; children, the elderly and sick, and the less-well-off 
were starving and dying in Leningrad. At the same time, Party 
officials and speculators were not living so badly. 77 Tensions within 
families emerged because of perceptions of individualism, i.e . that 
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someone was free riding and not pulling his/ her weight. Kobyzeva 
turned against her mother's «boyfoend» (initials B.A.) because he 
contributed little to the survival of their small living group; even 
though she saw he was ill, Kobyzeva, her mother, and B.A. 's 
daughter continued to seek out food , go to work, clean the house, 
gather firewood, and the like even as they became weaker from 
starvation and the cold. 78 Kedrov became ashamed at the behavior 
he saw at Party-sponsored banquets: for example, how people at one 
banquet ate food from each others' plates (including his) or greedily 
and not so slyly pocketed extra food (e .g. bread rolls) .79 In contrast, 
diarists often noted- sometimes with a sense of pleasure - how they 
and friends/ colleagues shared their apartment space, food, and time 
with each other; when many diarists slept away from home, they did 
so not only at work but also at friends ' places. Perhaps the ultimate 
expression is P,1tr Samarin 's remorse at being alone in the latter 
years of the Blockade. I explore his expression of the individual-
collective dichotomy below, as it is directly related to the moral 
economy of provision. For now, I note here that Samarin repeats 
feelings of despair over being alone. The stress from the struggle for 
food and against hunger ultimately led to a fall-out between him and 
his wife; this left him alone, which he felt his resulting state of being 
a solitary individual as intense loneliness, negative and abnormal. 
Suffering and Dying: the «Leningrad Death» 
Images and data on mortality in the Blockade are staggering: 
perhaps I. I million deaths overall, including at least 52,000 in 
December 1941 alone. Death, like the constant shelling, became part 
of everyday Blockade life. This was in stark contrast to the ideal 
Soviet socialist society, where death was of two types: that inflicted 
by the state (the agent of the socialist society) against enemies of the 
people, and death as fulfillment of the socialist life course, the end to 
a comrade's usefulness towards the revolutionary ideal. And even so, 
death and disposal in the 1930s was a problematic interaction of the 
ideals of Party elite and aktiv, on the one hand, and citizens, on the 
other. 80 Of course, the 1930s saw plenty of innocent victims of state-
inflicted terror or accidents of forced industrialization and 
collectivization, although these were often framed in propaganda and 
even in popular consciousness as prices for progress or the result of 
true wreckers and enemies. 81 In this sense, Soviet society was not so 
different from modern capitalist societies: death inflicted by the state 
towards enemies (external and internal), accidents rationalized away. 
However, if the war clarified the boundaries between sacred and 
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profane, it blurred the same boundaries between ideal and practice . 
The state that killed enemies could not protect its people, and it 
sometimes turned on them in the name of security. Further, while the 
Party struggled to eradicate remnants of tradition, especially religion , 
that were part of commemorating death (especially funeral rites) , it 
tried to create alternative sacred rites - socialist music (marches, not 
religious dirges), socialist disposal of bodies (e.g. cremation), and 
commemoration not through prayer but a recital of the individual's 
contributions towards collective socialist progress and reminders of 
how those present should continue such socialist work . 
The Leningrad death was bereft of such sacred rites. An important 
part of the process of confronting and categorizing death was 
witnessing the incredible number of corpses on the streets in the 
winter of 1941 - 42 , the result of starvation . Diarists first heard of 
starvation deaths, and then they began to witness them; and then 
they witnessed the horror of corpses left on the streets, as relatives 
had too little money or strength to bury them. (The horror of 
corpses with chunks of Oesh missing, and stories of cannibalism, 
emerge later.) What they saw was not part of the pre-socialist or 
socialist sacred rites , but rather emblematic of the profanity of the 
Blockade . Bodies were not disposed through formal funerals and 
graves. Those who died at home or work were left on the streets or 
in masses near disposal points, wrapped in linen (but not always). 
Those who died from starvation and weakness while en route from 
one point to another in the cold of winter 1941-42 rested where 
they fell. We recoil from the simple and occasional photographs of 
starving Leningraders dragging linen-wrapped corpses on sleds along 
snowy streets; diarists saw these every day , up close and in person . 
The corpses (not always intact) were a reality that imposed itself; 
they were not illustrations in a book that they could put down. One 
diarist noted how corpses were thrown (not laid) into mass graves; 
as to the frozen corpses along the streets, · some naked and missing 
Oesh, «I will remember that picture all my life.» 82 
How did Leningraders make sense of suffering and death? The 
sacred and profane appeared again but blended in a curious way. 
Some diarists commented on starvation as easy death: one grew weak 
and descended into death resting, while walking or in bed. 83 Yet for 
many, starvation was not normal. It was the opposite of modernity, 
especially promises of Soviet modernity. One gut reaction was horror: 
not just at the number of corpses that first winter, but how the dead 
appeared on the streets, under bridges, in cold apartment rooms or 
basements. From this emerged a sacred-profane dichotomy: the «good 
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death» in the context of care , and the «Leningrad death» through 
unnatural, man-made starvation and without care and concern .81 Part 
of this construction was the lack of a cof1in (grab) . Kobyzova noted 
how it was impossible to see fewer than twenty corpses on the streets 
as she went home from work. Her reaction : «What a horror- a dead 
person without a coflin.»85 Aleksandr Kedrov related how one radio 
employee whom he knew buried his father, but he explained what 
«buried» meant , implying the profanity of the Leningrad burial: «he 
simply placed [his late father] between other corpses lying around at 
that so-called ccmetery. »86 Lencncrgo/ Sevkabel planning official and 
cafeteria aid Irina Zelenskaia thought conins and proper burials were 
sacred. (The rhetoric of death emerges throughout Zclenskaia's 
overall narrative: she coded evacuations as «flights from death» and 
coined the phrase «Leningrad death» to refer to Boris ' death from 
starvation - in contrast to dying at the front, in combat.)87 She went 
out of her way on several occasions to maintain the sacred rites, in 
contrast to the profanity of corpses littering the streets without any 
care. As corpses began to line the streets, she made sure to note in 
her diary that the burial officia ls would only bury bodies that winter 
in exchange for bread. 88 When one «Uncle Petya» died , it became 
clear the authorities would not do anything , so she and her son-in-
law Boris decided to act. Weak as he was from starvation, Boris tried 
to build a coffin . Zelenskaia used her car - one of the few occasions 
she did so - to take Uncle Petya 's body to the cemetery. 89 A few 
months later her friend Mina died from starvation, and Zelenskaia 
decided to forego the burial bureaucracy. She and friends created a 
makeshift coffin, took the body in her car and quietly parked in an 
alley near a cemetery, and dug a shallow grave. Even then, Zelenskaia 
noted that there was no real moment of farewell , as in normal , 
legitimate funeral rites - but it was the best they could do. (Zelenskaia 
and those with her brought a kilogram of bread as a potential bribe , 
but they came across nobody who might oppose their ritual.) As 
Zclenskaia noted, «Only a few Leningraders this winter were provided 
with this kind of funeral. »91> 
This was the real horror of the Leningrad death: it was the 
dehumanization of death. As many diarists note , the corpses on the 
street stopped bothering them , as if they were no longer people but 
objects . Undoubtedly, the rumors or observations of people eating 
corpses (often indirect evidence, such as missing flesh) reinforced 
the profane category of the person as object for use, whether by the 
state or another starving individual. Cannibalism may have been a 
forbidden topic in post-war accounts, but diarists did not shy away 
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from it. One diarist wrote that one coworkers at his factory went 
insane after discovering he had eaten human flesh (perhaps bought 
at the 1ynok); a worker at another shopfloor of his factory was 
arrested for killing and eating several coworkers , and worker at 
another factory (he heard) had killed and eaten one of his children 
before going insane and dying.91 Some diarists could not mention it 
directly - but they alluded to it indirectly, suggesting that they 
understood the topic (cannibalism) and that any reader would 
understand it as well. Nikolai Gorshkov remarked about rumors of 
cannibalism but noted , «it is impossibly difficult to write about this. »92 
Ostroumova-Lebedcva hinted at cannibalism (and other horrifying 
stories) , only to comment that she would not write about it. 93 
Jn entries for the first months of 1942, diarists nearly always note 
the corpses , as if this were the height of Act two. 94 And many diarists 
noted that something inside all of them had changed as a result. 
Kobyzova understood that something had changed inside all 
Leningraders in this regard: as the snow melts and reveals yet more 
corpses, some with body parts missing , she notes that this no longer 
makes an impression on her- although the very act of recording her 
observations and noting this suggests just the opposite . «Interesting -
will I come to myself at some point , and how will I react to this 
survival? I will somehow have to survive all this all over again when 
I will be a normal personordinary corpses lying around on the streets 
make no kind of impression on me. In general, Leningraders now are 
not worried by anything except food. »95 Irina Zclenskaia saw the 
dehumanization of death as part of a wider problem of individualism 
and survival: as people became uncaring towards each other in their 
drive for individual survival , they also became coarse towards those 
who suffered and died around them. She feared one key to survival in 
Leningrad was indifference to others - which explained why 
Leningraders were unmoved and ambivalent about constant shelling 
or seeing death up close on the streets. 96 Nikolai Gorshkov agreed: 
hungry Leningraders were indifferent to the fates of those who had 
fallen or lost consciousness on the streets, seldom giving any aid. 97 
Sometimes indifference seemed odd: in some diaries the death of 
close friends and family attracts less notice than other topics. 
Zelcnskaia painfully watched close friends and family waste away; but 
one diarist barely noted the death of his father, 98 and another youth 
barely mentioned the passing of his father and brothers, preferring to 
write constantly about what he had to cat that day. 99 
Ultimately, one outcome of the Leningrad death was the bond 
it created , at least in the estimation of some. In particular, surviving 
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the terrible winter of 1941 - 42 created a potentially common 
identity - a community of sufferers who had starved and shivered 
as well, while living and contributing at times to the war effort. 100 
The same diarist who noted this juxtaposed the ubiquity of the 
Leningrad death with powerful signs of life: in April 1942 she saw 
a living dog. The significance was twofold : it symbolized both the 
horrors of the Blockade (eating dogs and cats, and on rare 
occasions people) and survival through such a nightmare -
reinforcing the sacred and profane of the «good death» and , 
logically , the «good life.» 
Moral Economy of War and Provision: 
Partici paring in the Profane 
Soviet civilization was supposed to be superior because it 
transcended the evil and irrationality of capitalism. The sacred ideal 
of anti-capitalism involved control via the state as agent of the 
working class. If the reality of the 1930s was one of constant 
shortages, at least this could be rationalized as the price for rapid 
progress towards the socialist ideal. Further, while the Soviet economy 
used money, it was more an accounting device than a story and 
expression of value. As in market economics, money could equate the 
amount of labor one had expended - it was as if storing one's labor 
for later expenditure . However, in capitalism, money can take on 
value independent of the exchange of labor, as happens in 
speculation .101 Hence the supposed superiority of Soviet socialism -
money had no independent meaning. State-based production and 
provision would, in theory, eliminate the nexus of money and , at the 
same time, of commodification and exploitation. Interestingly, war 
economics are not so different - increased state control over 
production and distribution under capitalism does not end private 
property or money's multi pie meanings, but it does mitigate them. 
Thus, war (and especially the Blockade) tested the Soviet moral 
economy of state-based provision free of the influences of property 
and money. In the end, that test created a powerful contradiction 
between the Soviet idea of state control and provision versus the 
reality of relying on quasi-market mechanisms and practices for 
survival. 
While the state-run economy could maintain production during 
the war and even evacuate entire factories to the east, it could not 
control all facets of economic transactions even before 1941. With a 
weakened state and survival paramount, underground market behavior 
returned, sometimes with a vengeance. Some economic liberalization 
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was condoned by the regime, but this more often related to small -
time artisanal production - and certainly not to food .102 The rynok, 
akin to a farmers ' market or bazaar , was legal , although trading via 
money was illegal or gray (selling a good at its production cost was, 
technically, not illegal). While there was plenty of buying and selling 
for money, people also bartered for bread or other goods in kind , 
which was on more solid legal ground , even if the value for goods 
was expressed in money (e.g. 400 rubles per kilo of bread and I 00 
rubles per bottle of wine meant four bottles of wine for one kilo of 
bread). This legal loophole could become the entering wedge for 
market relations to grow. The shadow economy had already emerged 
from the 1930s, and to give neoclassical economics its due , when 
commodities arc valued but scarce, their value (however expressed 
and embodied) will grow. Yet this was anathema to the very essence 
of Soviet socialism. Further, non-monetary trade in bread and 
commodities, autonomous and outside state control, meant that the 
market trade in bread and other needed commodities did not always 
fit perfectly into the scared-profane dichotomy: with the money link 
sometimes absent, such exchange could be coded as less profane in 
the Soviet anti-capitalist logic. To add to the complexity the moral 
economy and its challenges and contributing to the complexity of 
monetization and the moral economy was how the state made 
several drives for war bonds; Party activists would ritually campaign 
for workers to sign over several weeks or months of their wages to 
the state for the construction of tanks or other military materiel. 
That is , money still gained important symbolic power from the state 
as well as from the rynok. Thus, going into the Blockade, a potential 
sacred-profane dichotomy was ready to emerge: the sacred of fair, 
just provision of goods on the princi pie of provision to those who 
need or earn, versus the profane princi pie of provision going to those 
who have the advantage of superior reserves of capital (economic/ 
material, social). 
Diarists saw this contradiction in operation as the first Blockade 
winter set in. One simple expression of the contradiction of moral 
economy of war and provision versus market logic was the constant 
appearance of one oft-met diary entry: monetary prices for bread at 
the rynok. 103 Some diarists simply stated as fact the prices for 
different commodities over time ; even this, without commentary-
the fact of recording this observation (several times as prices 
changed) - suggests the importance of the money nexus and a 
market-like mechanism. Other diarists commented on high prices. 
Regardless of editorial comment, a reading of numerous diaries makes 
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clear that people found the monetization of food and other needed 
commodities (especially during the life -and -death struggle of the 
Blockade , when one would hope for more cooperative , survival-
oricnted behavior) sufficiently significant to expend time and energy 
to record such data . In other words , a rudimentary market logic had 
survived the 1930s. This wartime market for bread , butter, cigarettes 
and matches, and other needed goods, I suggest, has a dual meaning. 
First, it suggests the survival of market relations and monetary 
commodification- the supposed antithesis of Soviet socialism- making 
its appearance during the most trying moment of the Soviet system. 
Second, this reinforced the individual-collective dichotomy, albeit 
indirectly: the market was a place of individuals gaining Crom the 
needs of other individuals . 
The irony was not lost on everyone . The greater irony, however, 
was how people who could be critical of a monetary market for 
bread - and in monetary exchanges in general - could also 
participate in it without commenting on themselves or noting 
various contradictions. Some diarists, like Samarin, noted the market 
for food but did not pa1iici pate in it; in Samarin 's case, it is unclear 
whether this is out of conviction, lack of money or something to 
barter, or other reason. 104 Other diarists, such as Kedrov, saw even 
non-monetary trade in bread as profane, because those trading 
probably had more money than they could count. Such people «live, 
more sated than any of us. Oh, such swindlers, such scoundrels.»105 
Kcdrov also commented negatively on his boss ' daughters, who 
looked well-fed and well-dressed - he could not stand to be in their 
company long. 106 Related was criticism of how one actually obtained 
food or other goods: via formal procedures that, in theory, should be 
fair; via the money nexus of the market; or via the profane practice 
of informal patronage networks, i.e. blat. Bfat could evoke powerful 
negative comments and connotations, even if obtaining food could be 
difficult in the absence of perSDnal networks. Pntr Samarin quickly 
discovered this. Obtaining his proper ration of food at his workplace 
canteen was often difficult because he did not have proper connections 
with the staff or bosses in charge of food. «Without bfat - nothing,» 
was his comment. 107 In 1943, with a weak network structure that led 
him constantly to feel alone, he discovered that no one would help 
him obtain wine or vodka for the November 7 holiday. 108 Samarin 
was not the only person to note the importance of bfat. Tatiana 
Kartomysheva exploded in one entry about the injustice of blat and 
networks. «Protection» and blat were bad enough before the war; 
now, in desperate times, they were worse . To buttress her complaint 
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about widespread, immoral blat, Kartomysheva told a story (whose 
accuracy is impossible to corroborate) of doctors refusing to give 
milk to weak children on the grounds they would die soon anyway. 
Instead, they gave that milk to acquaintances' childrcn. 109 Shopfioor 
worker Ivan Savinkov believed there was a «food aristocracy» or 
those who organized its supply (e .g. food servers and guards at 
enterprise canteens) - they would make sure they all received extra 
rations, which they could consume or trade. He claimed such people 
stood out for looking well-fed and having good shoes or jewelry. 110 
The case of ironic critique in the face of panici pation comes 
from Komsomolets and communist believer Aleksei Evdokimov. 111 
His account is peppered with references to money in various 
contexts. He is always sending money to his family; he claims he 
cannot carry money in his pocket while he ICars that they may be 
hungry (a tacit admission of the importance of money in Stalin 's 
USSR). 112 His response to the raising of the bread ration in February 
1942 is to comment that «speculators» lowered the price or bread at 
the rynok. In that same month the appearance of the market gets to 
him, and in one passage he makes his first major critique or it: 
«There are sales [prodazhal without any shyness, here in the [bread} 
store or near it. Speculators stuff their pockets. At the Rzhevki , 
Porokhovyc, or any other rynok, on street corners or in stores , there 
arc flea markets so crowded that people are giving stuff, sometimes 
junk from 1935 .» 11 3 Yet despite his criticisms, he engaged in market 
behavior. For example, he wrote that in the second half of February 
1942 he paid 1500 rubles for bread; he commented, «I bought myself 
life,» apparently without openly recognizing the irony of «buying» 
life in context the Soviet utopia . (He obtained the 1500 rubles 
through an acquaintance.) 11 4 In March he used his bonus from work 
to buy more bread, and in late March he listed in his diary an 
account of money he spent on one day for food ( 1200 rubles): «So 
there 's how much life costs a person .» 11 5 In July 1942 Evdokimov 
even bought a record player from one Leningradcr preparing to 
evacuate the city; as he noted, money had gained «great weight» in 
the blockaded city. 11 6 In January 1943 he gave 900 rubles of his 
future salary for a state bond; this left his with little, and he had 
difficulty borrowing from his enterprise (and he was personally in 
debt to others). 11 7 As a result, he turned to doing repairs for others for 
extra money; he also bought a broken record player and extra parts 
for 32 rubles and resold it for 500 rubles. That is, the good 
communist Komsomolets was engaging in a wartime market 
economy - and even proudly showing the fruits of his labor~ 11 ~ 
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While he engaged the money economy of the Blockade, he admitted 
surprise that neighbors one floor up were arrested for counterfeiting 
money (the police found 6000 counterfeit rubles and counterfeit 
ration cards) --something he admitted he could not believe before 
when he had heard such news. 119 To add to his money woes, in April 
1943 he had to sell shoes and a new coat , but in June 1943 the Party 
started another drive to collect funds for state bonds, eating up part 
of his salary- driving him to ask where all his money was going to 
and why he was always poor. 120 
Good Komsomolets Evdokimov mentioned his and others' 
sufferings in the Blockade: hunger, disease (for him, TB) , shelling, 
cold. In his narrative, however , money is more prominent than in 
other accounts, including those or diari sts less well off. While he 
participates willingly in the money economy,he seems to retreat into 
Stalin 's promises , especially towards the end of the war - returning 
to socialist competitions of shopfloor production, participating in 
Party lectures, even wondering if he is a fool for putting up with 
silence from his wife (which he thinks indicated an end to their 
marriage) .121 His criticisms suggest a sacred-profane dichotomy, but 
survival forces him to partake in the profane. He even notes such 
activities, but he also retreats into Stalinist propaganda and Paiiy 
activities - as if engaging in acts of religious repentance reviving the 
sacred to cleanse him of the profane. The Blockade, it seems, was for 
[vdokimov and others a school in economic realities in the face of 
Soviet ideals. Certainly the shadow economy colored those ideals in 
the 1930s; but in the moment of life-or-death, the market reappeared 
with a vengeance and delivered that which the formal system 
sometimes only promised - bread. 
Conclusion: Interpretations, Meanings, 
and Making Sense of the Senseless 
On Friday, July 6, I began this essay, with Ekho Moskvy in the 
background. Under discussion was the popular rating of Petersburg 
governor Valentina Matvienko. After the usual sociological analysis 
came the turn for listeners to call in. The first few were pensioners 
(a man and a woman) and a seemingly middle-aged man. All complained 
about prices and the difficulty of life in Putin's wealthy new Russia -
one powerful expression Uudging from the tone of their voices) 
were prices of bread and ukrop. Bread and ukrop - echoes of the 
Blockade. While these callers likely were thinking not of the Blockade 
itself but of staples of everyday meals, the similarities in claims and 
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discourse were eerily striking - as if following ascri pt from the past , 
already taken-for-granted, far in the background but always present 
and exerting its influence even today. The experience of war continues 
to matter. This should not be surprising: after the end of World War 
II, police and Pany informants noted that some people harbored 
were critical of the Pa1ty and regime for low rations, 122 and even an 
self-proclaimed communist had to note how his son asked, in 
September 1947, «Papa, will there be such a time when we will eat 
our fill at the table?»123 Aleksei Evdokimov, reflecting in only January 
1942 o[ the horrors he had seen, wrote, «I hope that for me the day 
will come when we will all remember all this as something unhuman, 
unrepeatable , extraordinary, and heroically survived.» 124 
The experience of the Blockade as an extreme case of war deeply 
affected its victims, many of whom realized this at the time . Irina 
Zelenskaia noted in July 1942 that everyone had become cruel, cold, 
and insensitive towards the suffering of others . She and others easily 
recalled the faces of the starving - in Zelenskaia's case , the face of 
a small boy in line at her cafeteria who only stared at the food that 
by rules he could not receive . Only in July 1942 was some «human 
feeling» returning; only then did she cry over the death of son- in -
law Boris, who had died four months earlier. 12 5 Despite the return of 
a semblance or normality - evidenced by everyday banalities 
dominating her diary accounts - Nina Kobyzeva intensely felt the 
loss of her close friend Petya, who died at the front. As her own 
relations with her boyfriend worsened (in part due to his drinking 
and lack of attention to her), she returned to Pctya as an example of 
the sacred individual lost in the war: she constantly remembers him, 
wishes he were still around, wonders what they would be doing now, 
and recalls pre-war memories in which he figured. 126 
As James McPherson noted, for thousands of American soldiers 
(especially from the North) the experience of the Civil War created 
anew sense of identity and norms, including emancipation for blacks 
(contentious at the start of the war, and especially with the 
Emancipation Proclamation). 127 The experience of World War 11 
helped create the Soviet nation and at least partially legitimated the 
Soviet political and economic systems - but even then , only to an 
extent, as soldiers and citizens felt they deserved a political and 
economic thaw (including reforms of co!lectivization). 128 The war 
experience also could not but have altered constructions of social 
and political normality, structured through binary pairs of sacred and 
profane. This paper used the Blockade , a radical experience of war by 
non-combatants, to illuminate what these dichotomies were and how 
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they emerged. I briefly noted some or the sacred-profane dichotomies 
and suggested a more detailed list. What underlies many of these 
dichotomies is a sense of personal dignity . During the Blockade, Soviet 
socialism faced little real criticism. Fair provision of food and other 
goods and services - reflecting the moral economy of Soviet 
socialism - was reinforced, not contradicted, in diarists' narratives. 
Narratives of death and individualism suggested a paradox: increased 
sense of self (or selfishness), versus increased sense of dignity of the 
self, seen in repulsion to the lack of dignity in the Leningrad death. 
I would also like the venture one hypothesis: the experience of 
war created a template of sacred-profane dichotomies that, taken as 
a whole, contributed to the expectation of the post-war system, 
regime, and policies. Thanks to NKVD surveillance of the population, 
the regime cannot have been entirely ignorant of this (although we 
should not assume they were perfectly cognizant of it, either). The 
interaction of expectations and real policies resulted in real popular 
legitimacy of the Soviet Union as system and political community 
(nation) for a time. I would further hypothesize that if expectations 
were not met - i.e. the regime did not sufficiently satisfy such 
expectations as a political thaw on several fronts as a reward for 
sacrifice , as well as recognition of sacrifice (e .g. rebuilding Leningrad 's 
physical infrastructure and status) - the result would be the 
«Superfluous person » that writers in the nineteenth century noticed. 129 
While feelings of «superfluousness» would likely be of degree, they 
could create an interesting disconnect between popular hopes and 
beliefS versus the regime's claims (through its elite or propaganda-
police apparatuses). In this situation, the Soviet «nation» - if not 
born in the war, then certainly baptized and raised in it - could 
predominate over Party, socialism, and Revolution as the main totem 
for Soviet legitimacy. Such superfluousness could act as the Achilles' 
heel for any political hegemony. Paradoxically, the war strengthened 
the Soviet nation, system, and leadership while sowing the seeds for 
its downfall. The superfluous war generation (including blokadniki) 
would remain loyal because the regime - not meeting expectations 
and increasing both repression and bribery as the basis for loyalty -
deprived them of ritualistic reproduction of that meaning. 130 That is, 
the regime co-opted the war through a selected menu of meanings -
some that fulfilled expectations of sacred and profane, others which 
paid Ii p service - or the alternative of repression. Superfluous 
survivors supported the regime not through positive attraction, but 
because there was nowhere else to turn - theirs was a «captive 
loyalty.» They did not want wartime sacrifices to be in vain. 131 Future 
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generations would see the war as history, taken and (mis)uscd by the 
regime for gain , reproducing the cynicism that helped bring down 
the Communist Party and the USSR. 
While more work and data are needed , a few things seem clear. The 
intensity of suffering and conflict in general - because of the 
ferocity and power of the enemy - helped solidify a sense of unity, 
turning Soviet society into a community or sufferers. Pre-Revolutionary 
Russia fell apart because the war frustrated as much as it victimized; 
experiences of World War I I, especially the Blockade , were too seve re 
to frustrate. Survival came through individual and collective tactics. 
In the end the political elite may have gained temporary capital. 
What did emerge from World War II was the Sovie t nation; from the 
Blockade , a sense or first among equals wi thin that new political 
community - a status that Stalin and th e Moscow-centered 
Communist elite recognized , and against which they and successors 
would fight until 2000, when a native Leningrader would take 
command of the country. 
NOTES 
NB: In the notes the following abbreviat ions are used: 
GMMOBL State Memorial Museum of the Defense and Blockade 
of Leningrad , Written Documents Collection (Gosudarstvcnnyi 
Memorial'nyi Muzci Oborony i Blokady Leningrada , Rukopis' nyi 
Dokumental'nyi Fond) , St. Petersburg. 
RNB: Russian National Library, Written Records Collection 
(Rossiiskaia natsional ' naia biblioteka im. Saltykova-Shchedrina, 
Rukopis'nyi Fond), St. Petersburg. 
EGA: Central State Archive (Tsentral'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv) , 
state rather than Party archive, St. Petersburg. 
EGA/PD: Central State Archive of Historical -Political Documents 
(Tsentral 'nyi Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Istoricheskikh- Politicheskikh 
Dokumentov), former Leningrad Party archive, St. Petersburg. 
Archives arc organized through hierarchical systematization: fond 
(f., collection), opis (op. , register) , delo (d. , file) , list (! .,page), unless 
otherwise noted. (Some materials had not yet been archived and are 
referred to as «Akt ,» i.e. the formal act of accepting materials into the 
archive.) 
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(Cambridge: Blackwell, 1990). 
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ir, Positing the importance of popular meanings docs not deny the power of 
elites and states. f"urther, recent research of democracies suggests pluralism should 
not be sold short. Cf. Clem Brooks and Jeff Manza , «Soc ial Responsiveness in 
Developed Democracies. » American Sociological Review vol. 7 1 (2006) . pp. 474-
494. In non-democratic regimes, popular opinion and meanings may be less 
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(Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1992) . 
2° For example , the general trauma of the Vietnam experience - to both 
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'
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·'" TsG/\IPD f. 4000. op. 11. d. 35, I. 15: Zelcnskaia mentions signals flairs going 
up around the Sevkabel enterprise during one bombing raid. Adamovich and 
Granin (Biokadnaia kniga. p. 331 n.l) claim that there was no evidence for these 
!lairs. 
'' TsG/\IPD f. 4000, op. 11. d. 44, I. 38. 106. In November 1941. Kcdrov was 
surprised that Leningraders sti ll went about their business during air raid sirens 
and bombings - even the po li ce gave up cajoling them into bomb she lters 
;., E.g. TsGATPD f. 4000. op. 11. d. 35.1. 93: TsGA IPD f. 4000, op. 11. d. 44, I. 88. 
;< TsG/\IPD f. 4000, op. 11. d. 44, I. 21. 28. 31. 
'" This was a sore point for some diarists who complained of the Anglo-
American footdragging in setting up a second front. While logistics of the second 
front were daunting - especially as the Western Allies did not follow Stalin 's 
logic of incITTcicntly using resources, including people , wi ll y-nilly -- Leningradcrs 
in the grip of the Blockade should obviously be forgiven for impatience . Cf. 
CMMOBL RDF, Akt 76-07, vol. 2, I. 24; TsCiAIPD f. 4000, op. l I, d. 44.1. 77. 85. 89. 
95 , and 96. among others. 
" In post -war Leningrad , some inhabitants complained about food rations. 
the decline in their purchasing power as a result of Stalin's monetary reform . and 
the possibility of a new war, this time with former allies. C1iven that people made 
similar complaints before the end of war - whi ch the NKVD duly collected 
and reported (but not always as «an ti- Soviet ») -- is significant. Cf. TsCiA f. 7384, 
op. 36 , d. 129. 5' G reenfeld , Nationalism. chapter 3. 
59 Cf. Kotkin , Magnetic Mountain. especially chapters 4 and 5. 
60 One interesting issue that addresses this is theft. especially of food and 
ration cards. Theft is , in a sense, an expression of individualism: I steal from you 
for mv own survival. even if it hurts vours . Theft of food and ration cards was 
probl~matic in the Blockade; diarists ~ften note how people would steal food in 
a bread line, and how others in that line would promptly turn on the thief and 
beat him or her senseless (even if the thief were a sta rving youth). 
01 E.g. GMMOBL RDF. op. Ir, d. 37. tt3. 
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"' I also se nse here gendered narrative , where women were fickle and could 
not be trusted. Samarin ends one rant about his wife 's lack of truthworthiness 
wi th the comment, «Such are women .» In another entry , he mentioned the 
death of a comrade from work and complains about his wife, who did not seem 
shaken by the death and who did little to help him survive. GMMOBL RDf. 
op. l L d. 338. l. 73 , 89. 
"' E.g. GMMOBL RDr: , op. II . d. 338 , I. 57 , 58 , 73. 76. 77, 88. and 97 provide 
concise statements, although th ey arc not the only times he brings this up. 
Samarin blamed her youth - she was less experienced at getting along with 
people and understanding the need for cooperation , and the intense hunger that 
strained both their nerves. Eventually they split. and he complained bitterly about 
being alone. 
M One extreme expression of this was when parents would sac rifice their 
chi ld ren for their own individual survival. Some diarists did note hearing of such 
examples: however. the y seemed rare. 
6; TsGAIPD f. 4000, op. 11 , d. 35, I. 19. 
00 TsGAIPD f. 4000, op. l l. d. 35. l. 24, 6 1. Sec also I. 41 , 46 , 47. 
07 TsGAIPD f. 4000, op. 11, d. 35. I. 34 and 39 provide examples of this motif 
that recurs in her diary. 
68 TsGAlPD f. 4000, op. ll , d. 35, I. 22 . 
09 TsGAIPD f. 4000 , op. 11 , d. 35, l. 49. 
'
0 TsGAIPD f. 4000, op. 11 , d. 35 , I. 96 . 
. , TsGAIPD f. 4000, op. 11 , d. Vi . l. 72, 75. 
'
2 This is an important theme that runs throughout nearly every diary r have 
read so far. Those who survived consistently wrote , especially in 1941 - 42 , that 
they wanted to live, despite the difficulties of Blockade life . In some cases it 
almost seems that survival would be the ultimate act of revenge against the 
Gemans - denying them their goal of eradicating Leningrad and its populat ion. 
Only Zelenskaia, however, seems to have recognized and developed this idea. 
Whether wi lling oneself to live ul tim ately matte red cannot be tested from such 
diary claims, however, as it involves sampling on the dependent variable. 
11 GMMOBL RDF, Akt 76 -07 , vol. I, I. 15, 16. 
14 GMMOBL RDF, Akt 76-07 , vol. l , l. 70. 
75 GMMOBL RDF, Akt 76-07, vol. I , I. 61. 
16 GMMOBL RDF op. Ir, d. 37 , #3. 
77 Aleksandr Kedrov inadvertently shows how well the strata immediately 
below the Party and administrative elite lived. Kedrov himself was an assistant 
manager with unmentioned responsibilities or network relations that brought 
him into contact with members of the local NKVD. Although he never mentions 
his wages, he is able to send more than 2000 rubles to his evacuated family on 
several occasions. He and another acquaintance ( « P .M .>} ) are able to obtain beer, 
wine, sprats, and other relative delicacies in the winter of 1941-42. He is also 
invited to a banquet featuring Hero of the Soviet Union Preobrazhenskii, with 
ample food, drink, and dancing. Cf. TsGAIPD f. 4000 , op. 11 , d. 44 , \. I 04-1 OS. 
78 E.g. GMMOBL RDF, Akt 76-07, vol. I , I. 72 , and vol. 2, I. 8. 
79 TsGAIPD f. 4000 , op. I 1, d. 44 , I. 96-97. 
80 See Catherine Merridale , Nights of Stone: Death and Memory in Twentieth-
Century Russia (London: Granta, 2000). 
81 Davies, Popular Opinion in Stalin's Russia; Thurston, Life and Terror in 
Stalin's Russia . 
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;Q GMMOBL RDF. op. lp. d. 30, l. 84. 
xJ Blokadnye dnevniki i dokumenty , p. 59: GMMOBL RDF, op. lp , d. 30, I. 92. 
In the latter, the author muses that death by starvation is probably calm - but 
he would rather not die that way. 
·~~ Cf. GMMOBL RDF. Akt 315-90 , I. 5l. Commenting on the sight of corpses 
lyi ng hither-thither on streets and under bridges, in various stages of dress, this 
diarist concluded: «What has care about people come to , and where further will 
it go?» 
x; GMMOBL RDF. Akt 76-07 , vol.LI. 61. 
xh TsGAIPD f. 4000, op. l 1. d. 44 , l. 49. He also thought something criminal was 
afoo t in the burial business. Later police investigations did in fact reveal fraud 
and cormption in the city's burial services, including demanding money or food 
for burials, stealing and rese lling headstones, and adding «dead souls» to their 
lists to prove they were fulfilling their duties. TsGA f. 7384, op. 4. d. 78. 11 0-113. 
x' TsGAIPD f. 4000, op. I l. d. 35. l. 93. 
xx TsGATPD f. 4000 , op. l l , d. 35, l. 43 . 
x9 TsGAIPD f. 4000. op. 11 , d. 35, I. 45 , 48. 
90 TsGAIPD f. 4000, op. 11. d. 35, I. 83. 
91 GMMOBL RDF, op. lp, d. 30. l. 88, 107. 83. 
91 Blokadnye dnevniki i dokumcnty, p. 69. 
9
.i R).;B 1015, #57 . I. 17 1. This was January 1942: on February 3, 1942, however. 
she did give a name to this horror: «ln one word , in the city of Leningrad there 
is - cannibalism [liudocdstvo].» 
91 Some diari sts. such as Aleksei Evdokimov. li sted the names of people who 
died , bestowing a se nse of humanity and meaning onto the dead. Cf. GMMORL 
RDF, op. Ip, d. 30, I. 78. 
95 GMMOBL RDF, Akt 76-07, vol. 2, I. 25. 
% TsGAIPD f. 4000. op. 11 , d. 35 , I. 79. 
97 13lokadnye dnevniki i dokumenty. p. 60. 
9x GMMOBL RDF, op. II, d. 338. I. 95. 
99 GMMOBL RDF, op. II , d. 385. 
100 GMMORL RDF, Akt 315-90, I. 40. 
101 On the multi pie meanings of money, see Viviana Zelizcr, The Social 
Meaning of Money: Pin Money, Paychecks, Poor Relief, and Other Currencies 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997). 
102 Cf. Hessler, «A Postwar Perest roika?» 
103 Again , this does not mean that money prices were nonexistent in the Soviet 
Union. Workers received remuneration in wages (as well as in provision, e.g. of 
housing or other goods). Goods in stores were priced in money (although the 
value was set by the state rather than independent market actors). One way to 
use labor for the state 's advantage was through money or price reforms. I do not 
want to pain a black-and-white picture of money-versus-no-money. Rather, at 
issue is the meaning of money. 
104 GMMOBL RDF, op. II , d. 338, \. 108. 
105 TsGAJPD f 4000, op. 11 , d. 44 , I. 61. 
106 TsGAIPD f. 4000, op. 11, d. 44, I. 66. 
107 GMMOBL RDF, op. ll , d. 338, I. 97. 
108 GMMOBL RDF, op. 11 , d. 338, I. 112. 
109 GMMOBL RDF, Akt 315-90, I. 56. Interest ingly, her attack is on people, not 
275 
the ~y~te rn or incentives and rules that might engender, or at least support . such 
beha vior. 
11
•
1 TsCIAIPD f 4000. op. 11 . d. 99, I. 59. Throughout his di ary, Savinkov blamed 
the war for bringing out the worst in people, and Russian culture or mentality 
for its problematic morals and disorganii'.ation. 
11 1 Evdokirnov noted being active in the Komsomol and spent much time at 
his shop!loor trying to keep product ion running (for which he received a Red 
Star medal) . In his diary he also included new,,paper clippings about his 
prese nt at ions at Party functions , suggesting pride in such activity. Jn Dece mber 
1941 he experienced intense longing for his wi fe (evacuated from the city) ; he 
wrote , «I love he r as a wife and as a co mmunist comrade .» Later he was made 
commissar of his shoptloor. He was confident of victory, and ent ries in the first 
days of war have a ring or bravado. This sa id . the experience become~ so 
diITicult --cspecially the se paration from his wife and child - that in November 
1942 he wants to «throw out eve rything» and leave the city to be with th em. 
CIMMOBL RDF, op. Ip. d. 10. L 74, 11 0. 
iu CMMOBL RDr, op. Ip. d. 30. L n. In Ju ne 1942 he received a lett er from 
hi ~ wife: she noted that the food situation was bad, and food and li fe in general 
were expensive and that it was harder to li ve - - as if, to steal a line from Stalin . 
th i:lt «li fe had become more expensive.•> Alas, at that time Evdokimov had no 
money to se nd. C.iMMOBL RDF, op. Ip, d. 30, I. 99. 
111 GMMOUL RDF. op. Ip. d. 30. I. 83 . 84. 
111 GMf\10BL RDr, op. Ip. d. 30, L 85. 
!I > C!MMOUL RDF, op. Ip. d. 30, I. 87. 88 , 89. [vdokirnov docs not note the 
irony: he, i:I l<omsomolcts, survives because of' superior sa lary, and others with less 
money suffer more under socialism. 
l lh GMMOBL RDr, op. Ip , d. 30, l. 104. 
II' CMMOBL RDr. op. Ip . d . 30. I. l 19. l 26. 
11
' CMMOBL RDF, op. Ip , d. 30, I. 126. 127. 
IJ<} G MMOBL RDr. op. lp , d . 30, I. 120. 
' ·'G GMMOBL RDL op. lp, d . 30, I. !37, 143. 
w E.g GMMOBL RDF, op. Ip, d . 30, I. 169. 
L!!. TsGAf PD f. 25, op. 10, d. 528 , I. 7-8. 
iJ..o TsGAf PD f. 4000, op. 18 , d. 333, I. 165. 
11
•
1 GM MOBL RDF, op. Ip, d. 30, I. 8 1. 
1
'; TsCIAf PD f. 4000, op. 11 , d. 35, I. 92 . 
Po GMMOBL RDF, Akt 76-07, vol 3. Much of volume three covers her 
ongoing relations with «Vikto r» and everyday life; Petya 's death and her 
mourning also figure prominently, less in terms of words written than the 
emotion behind those words. 
in Cf. McPherson, For Cause and Comrades. 
128 My thanks to Nikita Lomagin for •sharing these insights from his own 
research into the Blockade. 
i n This is the thesis in O.V.Druzhba. Velikaia Otechestvennaia Voina v 
soznanii sovietskogo i postsovictskogo obshchestva: dinamika predstavlcnnii ob 
istorichcskom proshlorn (Rostov- na - Donu: Izdatel 'skii tsentr DGTU, 2000) . 
1.io Herc I mean autonomous rituals such as parades or other forums that 
allow people to reconstruct their ex pericnc.:es and meanings on their own, with 
minimal regime -sta te influence . The American Veterans of Foreign Wars 
organization comes to mind. Perhaps for this reason World War If retained 
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meaning that did not contradict the «formula of rule » and hegemony in the 
United States and United Kingdom. 
111 One interesting source to help explore this issue further is collections, 
published after glasnost 'and the collapse of the Party's monopoly of power, of 
reminiscences of Blockade survivors and soldiers . From what I have read thus far 
at this stage in my project, such recollections tend to focus on intimate . personal 
events: particular battles from former so ldiers· experiences (a pitched battle and 
receiving a medal, saving or being saved by a comrade, the comradeship of the 
immediate unit) , moments of fri cndshi p or horror from Blockade survivors . That 
is, the hroader context of regime, system. and society is usually missing in 
recollections. While the Soviet nation docs come up positively, it is not the 
centerpiece of recollections. (Needless to say.the Party and its wartime lcadershi p 
are ilbsent.) This suggests that superfluousness was in operation - and so the 
valued memories and meanings people do retain are personal. rather than related 
to the broader community. However, this must remain a hypothesis at this time. 
Including an analysis of such rellections and recollections is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but it is part of the broader project in which this paper is embedded. 
Cf. I. Y. Kosina (ed.), Blokadniki (Volgograd: Kornitct po pechati, 1996). 
Steve Maddox 
The Memory of the Blockade 
and its Function in the Restoration 
of Leningrad, 1944-1949 
In postwar Leningrad, the memory of the blockade informed all 
aspects of life. Leningrad's party and soviet leadership, ordinary 
citizens, and all else who suffered the horrors of the nine-hundred 
days felt the desire to commemorate the blockade and preserve the 
memory of it. For the people who lived through the blockade - the 
hlokadniki - it became the cornerstone of their identity.' No longer 
would they understand their surroundings through prewar lenses. 
Rather, the blockade became the formative experience through 
which the world was viewed.2 The magnitude of the siege, the mark 
it left on the city and its residents, as we11 as its significance in the 
immediate postwar period, necessitated its commemoration and 
memorialization. 
Plans to commemorate the blockade of Leningrad began during 
the event itself.3 Leningraders went to great lengths to preserve the 
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